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Boeing 737 Operating Download The PDFSign Up We will never sell or share your email address; well only use it to send you XPlane-related emails. X-Plane 2020 Privacy Policy Blog Press Kit Support Knowledge Base. Near real-time monitoring of employee communications by a unit of Boeings compliance group would have alerted senior management to ground-level issues with MCAS in parallel toand as a backstop tointernal reporting and escalation of the issue from engineering or other staff. Initial deliveries of the aircraft took place in May of 2017, and the plane entered commercial service shortly thereafter. Among the first passenger carriers to run the 737 MAX commercially were Lion Air, of Indonesia, and Norwegian Air, of Norway. Within a year of its launch, 130 737 MAX aircraft were delivered to 28 Boeing customers, and in total 387 aircraft were eventually delivered. The incident was widely reported by various media outlets at the time. Initial reports targeted a malfunctioning flight-control system which had to be disabled in order for the aircraft to function properly. Boeing 737 Operating Manual To AdviseResponding to the incident, Boeing issued guidance on its operational manual to advise airline pilots regarding procedures for handling so-called erroneous cockpit readings. Like the Lion Air incident from the year prior, the Ethiopian Airlines crash was widely reported. Coverage reported that the incident was similar to the Lion Air incident. The system, which Boeing did not disclose its 737 MAX pilot manual or in its supplementary directive after the Lion Air crash, was allegedly commanding the planes flight systems to repeatedly dive, based on erroneous systems data. Assessments and testing from a variety of sources within multiple investigations have raised issues with the way in which Boeing designed, developed and deployed MCAS, as well as its lack of training and education of pilots and crews on the systems existence within aircraft, when it would engage, and what to do in case of its malfunction. While, in the wake of the crashes, Boeing officials had maintained that MCAS was not designed to activate within the normal flight envelope of the 737 MAX and therefore its exclusion from the standard operating manual for the aircraft was warranted, the 2016 internal messages specifically highlighted that MCAS was erroneously engaging itself. The messages go on to indicate that, in 2016 or prior, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may have been supplied with inaccurate information regarding MCAS. Nevertheless, in 2017, the very same Boeing pilot, again communicating the FAA, requested that all mentions of MCAS be removed from the planes operating manual because its operation was outside of the planes normal envelope. ![]() However, it is unclear whether any reporting mechanism existed for members of the team (e.g., engineers, test pilots, etc.) to report such issues to oversight resources outside of the 737 MAXs direct value chain (i.e., officials and or at Boeing whose success was not tied directly and exclusively to the marketing and sale of 737 MAX aircraft). While knowledge of the ultimately disastrous MCAS failures was present within Boeing long before the first 737 MAX was delivered to a customer, it was contained in isolated pockets, hidden from the view of senior management at the corporate level whose success is tied to the overall health of Boeing as a company. While some concerned members of the 737 MAX development staff may have wanted to communicate their concerns upwards, and while senior management may have wished to hear their concerns, the communication channels simply did not exist. Instead of reporting concerns to a unit or personnel with proper oversight authority, engineers at Boeing were instructed to take their concerns to business unit managers, as reported by the New York Times. However, with their success tied directly to sales of the 737 MAX, business unit managers had strong incentive suppress the identification of safety risks and prevent escalation of same to members of senior management. In the wake of the 737 MAX situation, Boeing has indicated that it has adopted clearer escalation channels from engineers to neutral oversight personnel, including the companys senior management. At a firm of the size of Boeing, producing products (i.e., aircraft) which have the potential to be deadly in the event of failure, an independent unit should exist as a check on commercial business units such as development, manufacturing, marketing and sales. The success of such a unit should not depend at all on sales of products, but rather on the safety of those products at time of sale and beyond. In the wake of the 737 MAX situation, Boeing has announced the creation of such a group within the company. Monitoring of employee communications over company-provided systems (such as e-mail, instant messenger, SMS on company-provided phones, etc.), coupled with a general policy and enforcement program that all company business be conducted solely over those company-provided, and not personal, communication systems, is a crucial arm of risk management in an era in which employee communications are a major driver of risk.
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